Could McDowell Have Moved Faster ?

     It is interesting to read soldiers' letters to get a feel for what was happening as history unfolded.  It is especially interesting if the writer has a keen eye for observation and detail.

Stonewall Jackson's Valley Campaign;

Late May, 1862

          One of the criticisms of the Union forces trying to cut off Stonewall Jackson during his 1862 Valley Campaign, was that they moved too slow.  John B. Noyes, a private in Co. B, 13^th Mass. Vols, [Hartsuff’s Brigade] participated in the march and he agrees McDowell moved too slowly. 

     Here is the setup:

     General McClellan’s 100,000 troops are closing in around Richmond, the Confederate Capital. General McDowell is close by at Falmouth, with 50,000 troops about to join them.  In an attempt to draw off some of the pressure around Richmond, General Lee sends General Richard Ewell’s troops to the Shenandoah Valley to join forces with Stonewall Jackson and create a disturbance there.  Lee hoped the disturbance would draw away some of McDowell's forces to the valley.  The ploy worked.

     General Nathaniel Banks, greatly reduced army was holding the Valley for the Union.  His forces were outnumbered by the Confederates two to one.  When Jackson and Ewell surprised a small outpost at Front Royal, Va. on May 22, Banks’ small army was spread thin.  Jacksons’ force swept down on the small garrison at Front Royal and captured 700 of the 1,000 men posted there.

     Banks was taken off guard.  Positioned 10 miles west of Front Royal at Strasburg, he was loath to retreat, but had little choice.  Jackson could advance to Winchester and surround him.  By early morning the next day Banks was racing back to his supply base at Winchester 20 miles north.  His army made a gallant stand from a strong position on two hills southwest of the town on May 25th, but the 15,000 Confederates eventually broke the lines of the 6,000 Federals.  The defeat turned into a Union route, but a masterly retreat nonetheless.  Banks’ army didn’t rest until they crossed the Potomac River into Maryland 35 miles north.  The sometimes dis-organized Jackson, couldn’t pursue because he could not locate his Confederate Cavalry, who like the tired and hungry infantry had stopped to pillage the Union supplies left behind by ‘Commissary Banks.’

     The next day Jackson deployed his army to threaten points north, particularly the Union Garrison at Harper’s Ferry.  President Lincoln and the Washington authorities were panicked.   Lincoln ordered General McDowell in the East, and General Fremont in the West to join forces in the Valley in hopes of capturing Jackson with a ‘pincers’ movement.  McDowell complied with the President’s order, but, understanding the Confederate motives, he told the President, in a telegram March 24:

“I obeyed your order immediately, for it was positive and urgent, and perhaps as a subordinate, there I ought to stop; but I trust I may be allowed to say something in relation to the subject, especially in view of your remark, that everything now depends upon the celerity and vigor of my movements.  I beg to say that cooperation between General Fremont and myself to cut Jackson and Ewell there is not to be counted upon, even if it is not a practical impossibility.  Next, I am entirely beyond helping distance of General Banks; no celerity or vigor will avail so far as he is concerned.  Next, that by a glance at the map, it will be seen that the line of retreat of the enemy's forces up the valley is shorter than mine to go against him.  It will take a week or ten days for the force to get to the valley by the route which will give it food and forage, and by that time the enemy will  have retired.  I shall gain nothing for you there, and shall lose much for you here.  It is, therefore, not only on personal grounds that I have a heavy heart in the matter, but that I feel it throws us all back, and from Richmond north we shall have all our large masses paralyzed, and shall have to repeat what we have just accomplished.  I have ordered General Shields to commence the movement by to-morrow morning.  A second division will follow in the afternoon.  Did I understand you aright, that you wished that I personally should accompany this expedition?  I hope to see Governor Chase to-night and express myself more fully to him.

Very respectfully,

Irvin McDowell.”

     McDowell sent two divisions under General Shields and General Ord to the Valley.  The 13^th Mass were with General Ord. 

The March

     General Shield’s 10,000 men arrived at Front Royal May 31^st, in time to cut off Jackson who was still north of Strasburg.  But Shield’s hesitated, because Gen’l Ord was still a days march behind, and Fremont’s force had not yet appeared from the west. 

 James I. Robertson, jr.  wrote in “Stonewall Jackson,  The Man, The Soldier, The Legend” :  Jackson had no way of knowing that the Union “celerity of movement” necessary for his entrapment had turned into a comedy of errors.’  The author then relates Fremont’s blunders and Shield’s hesitation to attack.

     Way down the chain of command, a private in the ranks, yet a Harvard Graduate and astute observer who would one day prove a very capable officer in the 28^th Mass., Private John B. Noyes, complained in letters home, that McDowell could have quickened his advance to Front Royal.  He placed all the blame on McDowell, as at that time, hatred of McDowell was rampant among the officers and men under his command.  (The source of this contempt will be the subject of a future post.)

     In the midst of the campaign on June 8^th Noyes wrote his Father* about McDowell’s move from Falmouth to Front Royal :

     "Perhaps the insensate lollygagging of somebody who kept us on the R.R. from Alexandria to Manassas six hours longer than was necessary, that wasted a whole day at Manassas, a second between that place and Thoroughfare Gap by delaying the cars did not occasion the escape of Jackson.  Why in spite of all this delay we were not twelve hours late.   It took us just seven days to proceed from Falmouth to Front Royal.  The men could have performed the journey better in much less time.  Let us see.  We left Falmouth Sunday afternoon.  The brigade should

have been in Alexandria at 10 A.m. Monday, at Manassas at two o’clock, at Thoroughfare Gap at 3 o’clock of the same day, that is to say at Thoroughfare Gap in 24 hours.  This would have been allowing a large margin for the delay in transporting large bodies of men.  It takes but six hours to sail from Alexandria to Acquia Creek, and an hour or so to ride from thence to Manassas, and another hour to ride to Thoroughfare Gap which is but four miles from Alexandria.  We should have then had two days rations in our haversacks.  Instead of being there on Monday, we did not arrive till Thursday, about five o’clock.  The rebels did not destroy the water building I believe til Thursday A.m., or Wednesday, P.m. when Shields who started from Falmouth on Saturday overland was at the heels of the rebels. Tuesday and Wednesday would have brought us to Front Royal, not without having captured small parties of secesh.  We then would have been some 48 hours ahead of Jackson, and placed him between us and Fremont and crushed him.  As it was we were a half or a whole day late, perhaps I ought to say twelve hours.  Shields beheld the rear guard of Jackson retreating some six miles from Front Royal on Sunday A.m.  He came Saturday  P.M. but was compelled to await our coming before he could proceed with his eighteen regiments of infantry and 36 cannon."

     Noyes puts all the blame on General McDowell but for the wrong reasons, sighting professional jealousies as the reasons for McDowell’s delay.  In his letters home, Noyes continued to berate General McDowell for a myriad of other failings as a commander.

     Still, McDowell’s troops, as well as Fremont’s, did tarry, which allowed Stonewall Jackson to escape.   On May 30^th, Jackson’s forces “were nearly twice as far from Strasburg as the converging forces of Fremont and Shields.”**   On May 31^st Jackson reached Strasburg ahead of the Yankees.  He continued to push his exhausted army south and not only escaped, but out-witted and out-fought the pursuing Federal troops under Fremont and Shields. 

*MS Am2332 (52); Houghton Library, Harvard University

** “Battle Cry of Freedom, by James McPherson; p. 458.

General McDowell

Introduction:

It's not very 'Christmassy' but this is what I've been working on for the latest page of my website, 13thmass.org.  It's titled "A Change In Plans."  I've followed the new web page 'introduction' with some comments about General Irvin McDowell.  I promise a 'holiday' post before the season passes.

"A Change In Plans" (May 12-25, 1862).

President Lincoln’s relationship with General George B. McClellan deteriorated in early 1862 over McClellan’s apparent inaction.  Lincoln favored an assault on Confederate fortifications close by at Manassas. General McClellan believed Manassas was too strong to attack.

In January the newly formed Committee on the Conduct of the War, a political body hostile to McClellan, put pressure on Lincoln to learn the General's plans or force him into action.  McClellan remained silent.  On January 13th McClellan reluctantly attended a cabinet meeting and sullenly stated that he knew what he was doing, the President couldn’t be trusted to keep a secret, and that the army of the west would move soon.

     In February the general finally revealed his strategy to Lincoln.  He planned a massive advance upon Richmond, by way of Urbanna, before it could be re-inforced by the Confederate army.  Lincoln was skeptical and still preferred an immediate assault on Manassas.

     On March 8th, a week after General Bank’s advanced into the Shenandoah Valley from Williamsport, Md., the Confederate force near Washington abandoned Manassas and moved their defenses south to the line of the Rappahannock River closer to Richmond. Washington troops occupied Manassas and embarrassingly revealed the position had been held with fake guns, and a much smaller force than estimated; 36,000 men. Lincoln was furious.  McClellan’s force was 120,000 strong.  McClellan was demoted from General in Chief to Commander of the Army of the Potomac. 

     McClellan’s new plan, endorsed by his Corps commanders, was to sail around the Rebel defenses to the Peninsula and besiege Richmond, the Confederate Captital, with his huge army of 150,000 men.  Lincoln agreed but insisted McClellan provide 40,000 troops for the defense of Washington. Lincoln painfully remembered the two weeks in April, 1861, when Washington was cut off from the army, undefended, and vulnerable to a Confederate assault.

     McClellan complied but the troops reserved for the defense of Washington were spread out; 19,000 in Washington, 10,000 at Manassas, 8,000 at Warrenton (including the 13th Mass)  and 35,000 in the Shenandoah Valley. Lincoln’s advisers didn’t understand the strategy and McClellan had angrily left Washington in early April without explaining it. Lincoln’s loss of faith in his leadership bothered the General who correctly viewed the political forces in Washington as his enemies.  McClellan’s political support failed when he needed it most.  Seeing only 19,000 ill-equipped troops around Washington, the President withheld General Irvin McDowell’s corps of 35,000 men from McClellan to guard the capital.  Total troops withheld by the President reduced McClellan’s invading force down from the intended 150,000 men to 100,000 men. General McClellan thought his plan ruined and his chances for success greatly reduced even though he still outnumbered the Rebels by huge margins.**

     By mid May General McDowell was moving his newly reinforced Corps of 41,000 troops, including the 13th Mass, to link up with McClellan’s army outside Richmond.

     “It was understood that McDowell was to move his corps along the Fredericksburg and Richmond Railroad on the 24th of May, connecting, if possible, with the right wing of McClellan’s army at or near Hanover Court-House, and by turning the left flank of the enemy, prevent his receiving reinforcements from the direction of Gordonsville. This plan had been carefully considered and matured by McDowell, who had great faith in its success.”  (Three Years in the Army, by C. E. Davis, Jr.)

     General Shields 10,000 men were also en route to Fredericksburg to join McDowell, (detached from General Bank’s force in the Shenandoah Valley).

     Confederate General Lee anticipated and feared this massive build up of Union troops around Richmond, and wrote Stonewall Jackson to create a diversion in the Shenandoah Valley to draw off some of McDowell’s army.  Lee sent General Ewell to the Valley to re-enforce Jackson.  The diversion worked.

     Banks small force of 9000 men was divided at 3 outposts.  Jackson attacked and defeated one of these at Front Royal on May 23rd.  The next day President Lincoln ordered General McDowell to send 20,000 troops to the valley in hopes of catching Jackson. This change in plans greatly distressed General McDowell.   He protested that much would be lost and little gained.  General Banks was beyond his help and the best thing McDowell could do was continue towards Richmond to threaten Confederate forces there.  Nonetheless, McDowell complied with Lincoln’s order.  The 13th Mass, in Hartsuff’s Brigade was included in the force diverted to Front Royal.

     These political machinations and movements were beyond the scope of the men in the 13th Mass.  All they saw was the increased hardship imposed on them by General McDowell’s orders; the loss of baggage wagons and camp equipments that made life more comfortable, and constant drilling with full gear in temperatures near 100 degrees Fahrenheit.  They compared the progress made on other war fronts with the supposed inaction of McDowell whom they labeled Mc-Do-Nothing. He was credited with each new hardship and they developed an intense dislike for him."
(End)

Some Comments on McDowell (for the blog)

     In a post made earlier this year, another blogger queried his readers which Union General deserves a new biography.  One respondent reminded readers that General Irvin McDowell never had a biography written.

In my limited knowledge of him, the first impression is that he was a poor field commander.  And when I take a closer look, my second impression is that he was a poor field commander.  But I've read interesting things about him and certainly think he deserves a biography.  After all, he was a regular army officer who remained loyal to the Government and commanded the first Union army in battle, when called upon to do so.  He withstood the dislike of his superior officers and his subordinates. His plan for the assault at First Bull Run was sound, but he was forced into action knowing his army was not trained well enough for battle, which had serious consequences for the outcome.

In May, 1862, his plans to link with McClellan were fouled by orders from the War Department to proceed to Front Royal in hopes of getting Jackson. A strategy he felt was wrong-headed and which turned out to be so.  General John Pope seemed to be the only commander who had faith in McDowell, which is like saying Moe had faith in Larry.

      I can't understand when at the battle of 2nd Bull Run, on August 29th 1862, he failed to inform Gen'l. Pope that Longstreet's army had reached Thoroughfare Gap on the 28th, allowing for a junction of Longstreet's army with Jackson's army.  McDowell even shared Pope's impression that the Confederates were retreating on the evening of the 29th.

     On the 30th McDowell made one of the biggest tactical errors in the war, when he ordered General John F. Reynold's Division north of the Warrenton Turnpike to re-inforce the center of General John Pope's Union line, thereby leaving the entire left flank practically undefended.  Confederate General's Lee and Longstreet had  planned an assault on the Union left and McDowell provided the perfect conditions for it.  It was one of the grand charges of the war.  When Longstreet began his massive advance, McDowell acted quickly to correct his error while his superior General Pope still wondered if he had enough troops on the right and center.  It was General McDowell's quick action that saved Pope's army from being surrounded and annihilated.  General McDowell lead re-inforcements, artillery and the nearest brigades he could find, to Chinn Ridge to stall Longstreet's attack.  Pope was able to fall back to high ground and save his army.  Still McDowell was twice routed at Bull Run and shared the blame with Pope for the Union disaster.

He was even accused of treason by his own men. When he took a tumble from his horse it was a 13th Mass soldier (of course) who wise-cracked "three cheers for the horse."   Some claimed his unusually tall hat was a signal to the Rebels and that wherever the 'hat' appeared defeat and disaster followed."*  He was so slandered by his own subordinate officers, that after the battle he called for a court of inquiry which exhonerated him. (McDowell and his staff in 1862.  The 'hat' is standing, center).


I read of a gathering of soldiers years after the war in which General McDowell was present, an officer proposed a toast to him as an apology for wrongs done during the war.  McDowell modestly stood and said he never worried that the record of his service would not be set right, in time.


Had he won the battle of first Bull Run he would have been a national hero.  The lack of a biography is a lasting testament to his unpopularity.  Its been nearly 150 years (!), maybe its time to consider one.  General Longstreet's biography was titled "From Manassas to Appomattox."  McDowell's biography could be called "From Manassas to 2nd Manassas."  (possible book cover design).

*Quotes referenced from the book "Return to Bull Run" by John J. Hennessy.
**Referenced from Larry Tagg's "The Unpopular Mr. Lincoln."